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HashTran-DNN: A Framework for Enhancing
Robustness of Deep Neural Networks against
Adversarial Malware Samples
Deqiang Li, Ramesh Baral, Tao Li, Han Wang, Qianmu Li, and Shouhuai Xu
Abstract—Adversarial machine learning in the context of
image processing and related applications has received a large
amount of attention. However, adversarial machine learning,
especially adversarial deep learning, in the context of malware
detection has received much less attention despite its apparent
importance. In this paper, we present a framework for enhanc-
ing the robustness of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) against
adversarial malware samples, dubbed Hashing Transformation
Deep Neural Networks (HashTran-DNN). The core idea is to
use hash functions with a certain locality-preserving property
to transform samples to enhance the robustness of DNNs in
malware classification. The framework further uses a Denoising
Auto-Encoder (DAE) regularizer to reconstruct the hash rep-
resentations of samples, making the resulting DNN classifiers
capable of attaining the locality information in the latent space.
We experiment with two concrete instantiations of the HashTran-
DNN framework to classify Android malware. Experimental
results show that four known attacks can render standard DNNs
useless in classifying Android malware, that known defenses can
at most defend three of the four attacks, and that HashTran-DNN
can effectively defend against all of the four attacks.
Index Terms—Adversarial machine learning, deep neural
networks (DNNs), malware classification, adversarial malware
detection, android malware, denoising auto-encoder (DAE).
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware is a major threat to cyber security, and the problem
is becoming increasingly severe. For example, Symantec re-
ports that about 355 millions, 357 millions, and 669 millions
of malware variants were seen in the years of 2015, 2016,
and 2017, respectively [1]. Kaspersky reports that malware
attacked 2,871,965 and 1,126,701 devices in 2016 and 2017,
respectively [2], [3]. This calls for effective solutions for
detecting and classifying malware.
Machine learning has been widely used for malware detec-
tion and classification [4]. However, malware classifiers are
susceptible to the attacks of adversarial malware examples
[5]–[14]. Adversarial samples can be obtained by perturbing
(i.e., manipulating) a few features of malware samples that
would be detected as malicious. However, these adversarial
samples, while malicious, would be classified as benign.
Adversarial samples are a common threat, rather than spe-
cific to certain machine learning models or datasets [7], [15],
[16]. In a broader context, the problem is known as adversarial
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machine learning, which is relevant to a range of domains
(e.g., image processing, text analysis, and malicious website
classifiers [9], [15], [17]–[24]). Despite its clear importance,
adversarial malware detection has not received the due amount
of attention. This is true despite the recent studies [9]–[12],
[15], [19], [25], [26] that show how adversarial samples
can easily evade malware classifiers. The state-of-the-art is
that there are no effective defenses [19]. In this paper, we
investigate a new defense against adversarial malware samples.
Our contributions. In this paper, we make three contributions.
First, we present a framework for enhancing the robustness
of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) against adversarial mal-
ware samples, dubbed Hashing Transformation Deep Neural
Networks (HashTran-DNN). The core idea is to use locality-
preserving hash functions to transform samples to reduce, if
not remove, the impact of adversarial perturbations.
Second, we propose using a Denoising Auto-Encoder
(DAE) to regularize DNNs and reconstruct the hash represen-
tations of samples. This enables the resulting DNN classifier to
capture the locality information in the latent space. Moreover,
the DAE can detect the out-of-distribution samples that are far
from the support of the underlying distribution of the training
data (i.e., filtering adversarial samples resulting from large
perturbations).
Third, we introduce the notion of Locality-Nonlinear Hash
(LNH) functions and presents a concrete construction that
achieves a bounded distance-distortion property in the cube
{0, 1}n with respect to the normalized Hamming distance
metric. We conduct systematic experiments with a real-world
dataset. Some of the findings are highlighted as follows.
• Standard DNNs for Android malware classification can
be ruined by adversarial samples generated by the follow-
ing four attacks: the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack
(JSMA) [9], [27]; the Gradient Descent with Kernel
Density Estimation attack (GD-KDE) [5]; the Carlini-
Wagner (CW) attack [18]; and the Mimicry attack [6].
• HashTran-DNN can substantially enhance the robustness
of DNN classifiers against the four attacks mentioned
above. This robustness enhancement can be attributed to
the fact that HashTran-DNN combines hash functions and
DAEs to make DNN classifiers capable of attaining the
locality information of samples in the latent space, reject-
ing the out-of-distribution samples, and defeating attacks
that attempt to manipulate “important” features only (e.g.,
the CW attack) or manipulate features arbitrarily to a
2large extent (e.g., the Mimicry attack).
• With respect to the four attacks mentioned above,
HashTran-DNN is more robust than the defense mech-
anism known as Random Feature Nullification (RFN)
[19], which is not effective against any of the four attacks
mentioned above. With respect to the JSMA, GD-KDE,
and CW attacks, HashTran-DNN is comparable to the it-
erative Adversarial Training defense [21], which however
assumes that the defender knows the adversarial samples
generated by the attackers. Moreover, HashTran-DNN
is more robust than the iterative Adversarial Training
defense against the Mimicry attack.
Paper outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II discusses the related prior studies. Section III
reviews some preliminary knowledge. Section IV presents
locality-preserving hash functions. Section V describes the
HashTran-DNN framework. Section VI presents our experi-
ments and results. Section VII discusses the limitations of the
present study. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Deep learning is successful in image processing [28], natural
language processing [29], and speech recognition [30]. Since
our focus is on improving the robustness of DNN-based
malware classifiers, we emphasize on this topic.
From an attacker’s perspective, there are three types of
attacks: black-box vs. white-box vs. gray-box. In the black-
box attack model, the attacker only has black-box access to the
classifier; in the white-box attack model, the attacker knows
everything about the defender’s model; the gray-box attack
model resides in between (e.g., the attacker has access to the
defender’s training dataset, feature set, and some information
about the defender’s DNN architecture). In this paper, we will
focus on the gray-box model, especially the aforementioned
four attacks (see Section III-B for details).
From a defender’s perspective, Figure 1 highlights three de-
fense approaches: adjusted input, adjusted training procedure,
and adjusted network architecture, which are elaborated below.
Fig. 1: Defense approaches against adversarial samples.
The adjusted input approach aims to transform an input
image to reduce its vulnerability to perturbation by, for ex-
ample, retraining [21], [31] with known adversarial samples
and penalizing perceptible adversarial spaces. The weakness
of this approach is that the defender needs to know adversarial
samples at the training time [18], [19], while noting that
ensemble retraining [23] may alleviate the problem somewhat.
A related method [32] is to apply a generative model to clean
up the distortions and uses a joint stacked Auto-Encoder (AE)
to preprocess an input. However, the AE itself is vulnera-
ble to adversarial samples [32]. Feature squeezing [33] and
Thermometer encoding [24] can cope with image pixels with
quantization strategies, but cannot deal with binary features.
This approach has been adopted to train malware detec-
tors [19], [20], [34]. For example, Wang et al. [19] intro-
duced the idea of Random Feature Nullification (RFN), which
randomly nullifies some features to make DNN classifiers
non-deterministic. However, sophistical attacks can confound
with the RFN defense because it cannot nullify all of the
“important” features, which may be exploited by the attacker.
HashTran-DNN also utilizes randomness to thwart adversarial
malware samples, but is more robust than the RFN defense.
The adjusted training procedure approach aims to identify
the optimal resistance against adversarial samples. Goodfellow
et al. [17] describe adversarial training as a regularization
term for decreasing the generalization error. This idea is later
extended to the setting of semi-supervised learning [22]. A
limitation of this approach is also that the defender does not
know all adversarial samples. Another idea [35], [36] is to treat
adversarial examples as an extra category, which is however
ineffective [37]. Inspired by the observation that large singular
values in the weight matrices contribute to the vulnerability of
DNNs [7], yet another idea [38] is to use parseval networks.
In contrast to these studies, HashTrah-DNN uses DAEs to tune
parameters at the hidden layers to decrease DNNs’ sensitivity
to adversarial perturbations.
The adjusted network architecture approach aims to ad-
just the architecture of the hidden layers to defend against
adversarial samples. Krotov et al. [39] propose the idea of
Dense Associative Memory, which uses higher-than-quadratic-
order activation functions. Another method [40] is to use a
distillation mechanism to compress the vanilla model into a
small network, but is known to be vulnerable [18].
III. PRELIMINARIES
In order to improve readability, Table I summarizes the main
notations that are used throughout the paper.
A. Deep feed-forward neural networks
In this paper, we focus on DNNs with a softmax layer and
l hidden layers. A DNN classifier takes an input ~x ∈ Rn and
produces an output ~ˆy = Z(~x) = [Z1(~x), . . . , Zo(~x)] ∈ Ro,
where o is the number of classes (e.g., o = 2 for malware
classification). The output
Z(~x) = softmax(F (~x)) (1)
where F (~x) = Fl(· · ·F2(F1(~x; θ1); θ2) · · · ) (2)
gives the probabilities that sample ~x respectively belongs to
one of the o classes, where
Fi(~x, θi) = σ(θi · ~x+ bi) (3)
3TABLE I: Summary of notations
Notation Meaning
n the number of dimensions of data samples
o the number of classes
d height of decision binary trees
dH (·, ·) Hamming distance
d¯H (·, ·) normalized Hamming distance
~x, ~x1, ~x2 ∈ Rn samples represented as vectors
xi ∈ R the i-th component of ~x
δ~x ∈ R
n adversarial perturbation to ~x
~x′ ∈ Rn adversarial sample and ~x′ = ~x+ δ~x
ǫ upper bound of perturbations, i.e., ‖δ~x‖0 ≤ ǫ
yi ∈ [o] ground truth label of ~xi, [o] = {1, 2, . . . , o}
~yi ∈ {0, 1}
o one-hot encoding ground truth label of ~xi
χ ⊆ Rn×[o] training data set {(~xi, yi)}
N
i=1
Z : Rn → Ro a DNN (including its softmax layer)
~ˆy ∈ Ro the output of a DNN on input sample ~x
C : Ro → [o] classification labels based on ~ˆy
L(θ; ~x, ~y) cross entropy with parameters θ, feature vector ~x
and label vector ~y
{Hi}i∈I a family of hash functions
←R sampling from a set uniformly at random (with
replacement)
hi : R
n → R a hash function sampled from {Hi}i∈I
gKLSH a vector of K locality-sensitive hash functions
(LSH), i.e., gK
LSH
= [h1, h2, · · · , hK ]
DT
m,d
i,j decision tree function with height d . DT
m,d
i,j :
R
m → {0, 1}2
d−1
, where i and j are indices
gKLNH a vector of locality-nonlinear hash (LNH) func-
tions, i.e., gKLNH = [DT
m,d
i,1 , . . . ,DT
m,d
i,K ]
H a family of hashing transformations, e.g., gK
LSH
and
gKLNH
HLSH or LSH a family of g
K
LSH hashing transformations
HLNH or LNH a family of g
K
LNH hashing transformations
MH(~x) Matrix representation for sample ~x under H
with some non-linear activation function σ (e.g., sigmoid,
ReLU [41], or ELU [42]), weight matrix θi, and bias bi. Let
C(Z(~x)) = argmax
i
(Zi(~x)), 1 ≤ i ≤ o (4)
denote the class (or label) a DNN classifier assigns to sample
~x, where argmax
i
(·) returns the index of the class that has the
maximum probability. At the training phase, a loss function is
minimized via backpropagation (see, for example, [43], [44]).
Moreover, we consider a modified DNN Z ′ which takes a
matrix inputM = [~m1; . . . ; ~mL] with each ~mi as a row vector,
and
Z ′(M) =
softmax(Fl(· · ·F2(F 11 (~m1; θ11), . . . , FL1 (~mL; θL1 ); θ2) · · · )).
(5)
B. Attacks for generating adversarial samples
An adversarial sample is represented as ~x′ = ~x+ δ~x, where
~x is the original sample and δ~x is a perturbation vector. Then,
σ(θi·~x′ + bi) = σ(θi·~x+ θi·δ~x + bi), (6)
where θi·δ~x is the distortion item. In the context of malware
classification, any perturbation should preserve the malicious
functionality of the original sample (i.e., an adversarial sample
can run in the same environment to cause damages).
Small vs. large perturbations. We distinguish adversarial
samples based on the degree of perturbation, small vs. large,
because they can be treated differently. On one hand, the
fact that some elements of the weight matrix θi are overly
large [17], and therefore can be exploited by the attacker to
craft a slight perturbation vector δ~x such that C(Z(~x
′)) 6=
C(Z(~x)), where “slight perturbation” means that the degree
of perturbation is bounded by a certain norm (e.g., ℓ0, ℓ2,
or ℓ∞ norm) such that ~x′ is not far from ~x. On the other
hand, an attacker can arbitrarily manipulate the original sample
~x to generate an adversarial version ~x′ that is far from the
underlying data distribution.
Four attacks in the gray-box model. As mentioned above,
we focus on the gray-box attack model, in which the attacker
can train DNN classifiers on its own and then leverage them
to generate adversarial samples [7], [17], [18], [45]. The
transferability property of machine learning contributes to the
effectiveness of these attacks [7], [8], [15], [16], [27], [35].
1) Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA): This is a
gradient-based attack [27], in which the attacker looks for the
optimal perturbation based on the Jacobian matrix of the DNN
feed-forward function with respect to an input ~x, namely
JZ(~x) =
∂Z(~x)
∂~x
= [
∂Zj(~x)
∂xi
]i∈1···n,j∈1···o. (7)
In order to make the target DNN misclassify the perturbed
version of ~x, the attacker can leverage the saliency map
S(~x, y′)[i] =
{
0 if
∂Zy′ (~x)
∂xi
< 0 or
∑
j 6=y′
∂Zj(~x)
∂xi
> 0
(
∂Zy′ (~x)
∂xi
)|∑j 6=y′ ∂Zj(~x)∂xi | otherwise,
such that ~x is perturbed at locations i if S(~x, y′)[i] gives the
largest value. The perturbation maximizes the changes of the
DNN classifier outputs in the desired output direction. This at-
tack has been used against DNN-based malware classifiers [9].
2) Gradient Descent with Kernel Density Estimation (GD-
KDE) attack: This is an optimization-based attack [5], in
which the attacker attempts to find the optimal adversarial
sample ~x′ that minimizes the following objective:
min
x′
gˆ(~x′)− λ
Nt
Nt∑
i|yi=y′
k(~x′, ~xi), subject to ‖~x′ − ~x‖ < ǫ,
where gˆ(~x′) estimates the cost of the posterior probability of
the target label y′ with y′ 6= y, k(·, ·) is a kernel density
estimator (e.g., Laplacian kernel) for lifting ~x′ to the populated
region of target samples, λ is the weight factor, Nt is the
number of target samples, and ‖·‖ refers to a norm of interest.
3) Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack: This is an optimization-
based attack [18], in which the attacker attempts to find an
adversarial sample ~x′ such that the perturbation vector δ~x is
minimized and the classifier misclassifies ~x′, leading to the
following formulation:
min
δ~x
‖δ~x‖22 + λf(y, ~x+ δ~x), where (8)
f(y, ~x+ δ~x) = max
{
F (~x + δ~x)y −max
i6=y
{F (~x+ δ~x)i} ,−ι
}
,
where F (·) is the output of a DNN prior to the softmax layer,
ι is a scalar controlling the mis-classification confidence, λ is
the penalization factor. Since the ℓ0-norm is not differentiable,
the ℓ2-norm can be used instead.
44) Mimicry attack: In this attack [6], the attacker attempts
to modify a malware sample ~x into an adversarial sample
~x′ such that ~x′ mimics a chosen benign sample as much as
possible. This attack is applicable to any classifiers because it
does not require the attacker to know the defender’s machine
learning algorithm.
C. Two defenses proposed in the literature
We will compare HashTran-DNN with two defense meth-
ods. The first defense method is called Random Feature
Nullifications (RFN) [19], which randomly nullifies features
at both the training phase and the testing phase. Specifically,
given (i) a batch of N training samples {~xi}Ni=1 and their
one-hot encoding labels {~yi}Ni=1, and (ii) a random feature
nullification function fF , the defense aims to minimize the
following objective function:
min
θ
1
N
N∑
i=0
L(θ;Z(fF (0i, ~xi)),~yi),
where 0i = ⌈n× pi⌉ is the number of nullified features
in input ~xi, the probability pi is sampled from a Gaussian
distribution, and ⌈·⌉ is the ceiling function.
The second defense method is called Adversarial Train-
ing [7], [17], [21], and can be used for most machine learning
algorithms. The Iterative Adversarial Training method [21]
aims to minimize the following cost function:
min
θ
1
N1+λ(N−N1)
(
N1∑
i=0
L(θ; Z(~xi),~yi) + λ
N∑
i=N1
L(θ; Z(~xi
′),~yi)
)
,
where ~xi
′
is an adversarial example perturbed from ~xi, N1
is the number of unperturbed samples in the training set, λ
strengths the penalization for adversarial mis-classifications.
A similar idea, called proactive training, was investigated in
[20] with respect to decision-tree classifiers .
IV. LOCALITY-PRESERVING HASH FUNCTIONS
In this section we first review Locality-sensitive hashing
(LSH) and then introduce locality-nonlinear hashing (LNH).
A. LSH
LSH [46] is a family of hash functions, denoted by {Hi}i∈I
where Hi : R
n → R with the following property: For a
fixed Hi (determined by index i), two “nearby” inputs are
mapped to the same hash value with a high probability, but
two “distant” inputs are mapped to the same hash value
with a small probability, where the distance can be Jaccard,
Hamming (based on the ℓ0-norm, and denoted by dH ), or
the ℓp-norm. In the present paper, we focus on the ℓ0-norm
because the datasets use a binary representation of malware
features, leading to the Hamming space. Formally, we have:
Definition 1 (LSH hash functions [46]). A LSH function
Hi(·) has the following locality-sensitivity property: For two
inputs ~x1 and ~x2 such that dH(~x1, ~x2) ≤ ǫ for some ǫ,
the probability Pr(Hi(~x1) = Hi(~x2)) is large; otherwise,
Pr(Hi(~x1) = Hi(~x2)) is small.
An example of LSH is the following [46]. Consider the
Hamming distance over a bit vector ~x ∈ {0, 1}n, LSH
functions {Hi}i∈I can be constructed from the bit sampling
method [46], which randomly selects a bit from the input
~x as the hash value. However, this construction has two
weaknesses: (i) It is a linear transformation, and therefore
vulnerable to adversarial examples [17]. (ii) It leads to linearly
correlated hash values when applied to samples that are overly
sparse in {0, 1}n, which can undermine the locality-sensitivity
property and therefore its usefulness in defending against
adversarial samples.
In order to enhance the locality-sensitivity property, we can
use a vector of K LSH functions, denoted by
gKLSH = [h1, h2, . . . , hK ],
where hj ←R {Hi}i∈I for 1 ≤ j ≤ K and “←R” means
sampling uniformly at random (with replacement). This leads
to a hashing transformation
gKLSH(~x) = [h1(~x), h2(~x), . . . , hK(~x)].
We can repeat the aforementioned sampling process, leading
to L independent gKLSH functions, denoted by
HLSH = {gKLSH,1; gKLSH,2; . . . ; gKLSH,L}.
When the meaning is clear from the context, we may use LSH
and HLSH interchangeably to simplify the presentation.
Algorithm 1: Constructing HLNH from LSH family {Hi}i
Input: Training data χ = {(~x, y)}, where y is the ground
truth label of ~x; LSH family {Hi}i∈I ; d
(Decision Tree height); m (the length of random
feature sub-vectors for training a Decision Tree);
L (number of hashing transformations); K
(number of Decision Trees used in a hashing
transformation)
Output: HLNH(~x), which is a binary matrix of L rows
and K × 2d−1 columns
1 for i = 1 to L do
2 for j = 1 to K do
3 Choose m LSH functions
h1,h2, . . . ,hm ←R {Hi}i;
4 for (~x, y) ∈ χ do
5 define [h1(~x), h2(~x), . . . , hm(~x)] as feature
representation of ~x;
6 end
7 Train a full-binary Decision Tree DT
m,d
i,j of
height d (and 2d−1 leaves) from the transformed
data {[h1(~x),h2(~x), . . . ,hm(~x)], y}(~x,y)∈χ;
8 Label the leave of Decision Tree DT
m,d
i,j
corresponding to the path DT
m,d
i,j (~x) as “1” and
each of the other 2d−1 − 1 leaves as “0”;
9 end
10 end
11 return
HLNH(~x) = [g
K
LNH,1(~x); g
K
LNH,2(~x); . . . ; g
K
LNH,L(~x)] /*
a matrix of L rows and K × 2d−1 columns */
5B. LNH (Locality-Nonlinear Hashing)
We introduce LNH, which does not have the afore-
mentioned weaknesses of bit sampling. As shown by Algo-
rithm 1, the idea is to construct a family of hashing transfor-
mations HLNH from LSH functions {Hi}i∈I , as follows:
(i) Use LSH functions to transform samples {~x} to their
hashed values [h1(~x), h2(~x), . . . , hm(~x)] for K indepen-
dent times.
(ii) Use these hashed values (i.e., has representations)
of the training samples and their labels, namely
{[h1(~x), h2(~x), . . . , hm(~x)]; y}(~x,y)∈χ, to train a De-
cision Tree DT
m,d
i,j of height d and 2
d−1 leaves, where
1 ≤ j ≤ K .
(iii) For each Decision Tree DT
m,d
i,j , label its leaves
as follows: The leave on the path corresponding
to DT
m,d
i,j (~x) is labeled as “1”, and each of the
other 2d−1 − 1 leaves is labeled as “0”. Then,
define gKLNH = [DT
m,d
i,1 , . . . ,DT
m,d
i,K ] and hence,
gKLNH,i(~x) = [leaves of DT
m,d
i,1 from left to right, . . .,
leaves of DT
m,d
i,K from left to right], which is a binary
vector of K × 2d−1 elements.
(iv) Repeat (i)-(iii) for L times, leading to a fam-
ily of gKLNH hashing transformations, i.e., HLNH =
{gKLNH,1; gKLNH,2; . . . ; gKLNH,L}.
When the meaning is clear from the context, we may use use
LNH and HLNH interchangeably to simplify the presentation.
...
1  0 0 0   0 0  1 0  
✁
  0 0  1 0
...
0  0 1 0  0 0 0  1   
✁
  0  0 1  0
...
...
0 0 0  1  0  1 0 0   
✁
  1  0 0  0
LNH ,1
1
2
⋯
LNH ,2
LNH ,
1  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 ⋯ 0  0  1  0
0  1  0  0  0  0  0  1 ⋯ 0  0  1  0
⋯
0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0 ⋯ 1  0  0  0
2
DT1,1
, DT1,2
, DT1,
,
DT ,1
, DT ,2
, DT ,
,⃗
LNH ( ⃗)
1
Fig. 2: Illustration of computing HLNH(~x), where each Deci-
sion Tree is a full binary tree of height d = 3.
Figure 2 illustrates the construction of HLNH and com-
putation of HLNH(~x) as a binary matrix of L rows and
K × 2d−1 columns. Now we make some observations. First,
the use of Decision Trees makes HLNH(·) nonlinear and non-
differentiable. Second, when LSH functions are constructed
from the bit sampling method, HLNH can be seen as a partic-
ular kind of random subspace method [47], which decreases
the generalization error of learning-based models. Third, it
is known [15] that individual Decision Trees are vulnerable
to “cross-model” adversarial examples crafted from other
learning techniques (e.g., support vector machine, DNNs).
This is no concern because we use a forest of Decision Trees,
each of which is learned from some random feature subspace.
V. THE HASHTRAN-DNN FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present the HashTran-DNN framework
and a theoretic analysis of it.
A. Basic idea
The HashTran-DNN framework is centered at the idea
of constructing a family of hashing transformations H =
{Hj}j∈TH with a locality-preserving property specified by
Ineq. (9) below. Two examples of H are the aforementioned
HLSH and HLNH, meaning that Hj can be instantiated as
either gKLSH,· or g
K
LNH,· and that Hj(~x) returns a vector. Let us
first consider the case the attacker makes small perturbations
while preserving the malicious functionality of the adversarial
samples. Specifically, consider a sample ~xi, its label yi, and
an adversarial sample ~xi
′
derived from ~xi and perturbation
‖δ~xi‖0 ≤ ǫ for some ǫ > 0, the defense aims to assure:
E[#{j ∈ TH : Hj(~xi) = Hj(~xi′)}] ≥ Θ (9)
C(Z ′(MH(~xi)))) = C(Z(~xi)), (10)
where E[·] is the expectation function,# denotes the cardinal-
ity of a set, Θ is the desired robustness, MH(~x) is the matrix
representation of H(~x), Z ′ is a newly constructed DNN that
takes hashing matrix as the input (see Eq. (5)), and C(·) returns
a DNN’s prediction on labels of samples.
On one hand, Ineq. (9) indicates the robustness against
adversarial samples. Specifically, a large Θ indicates a high
robustness because a large Θ means there are more hashing
transformations {H}j∈TH that can “eliminate” the effect of
adversarial perturbations (i.e., the perturbations are useless to
the attacker). As we will see, this property can be rigorously
proved as Theorem 1 in Section V-C.
On the other hand, Eq. (10) assures the classification
accuracy by requiring that the newly constructed DNN assigns
the same label to the hash-transformed representation Hj(~x)
of ~x as to ~x. However, Eq. (10), while intuitive, is difficult
to prove. Therefore, we consider the following alternative
with a weaker guarantee: Given binary feature vectors, there
exist hashing transformations, Hj ∈ H, that are close to
the distance-preserving transformation with respect to the
normalized Hamming distance. This means that the hashing
transformation would not cause much metric distortion in
the Hamming cube of the original feature space. This is
important because classification accuracy is highly dependent
upon the underlying low dimensional structure of the samples,
as reported by a recent study [48]. The alternate guarantee is
proven as Theorem 2 in Section V-C.
Now we consider the case of large perturbations while pre-
serving the malicious functionality of the adversarial samples.
In this case, Ineq.(9) can be thwarted. In order to defend
against such attackers, we leverage auto-encoders to detect
adversarial samples that are far from the training sample
space [35]. At this stage, we are only able to empirically
show the effectiveness of HashTran-DNN against large per-
turbations; theoretic treatment is left as an open problem.
6Fig. 3: The HashTran-DNN framework. (a) HashTran-DNN architecture, which adds a hashing layer to a feed-forward DNN.
(b) Training and testing phases in HashTran-DNN: the training phase aims to minimize the classification error and leverage the
DAE (to reconstruct the hash representations) to regularize the DNN. The testing phase aims to reject the out-of-distribution
examples based on the DAE reconstruction error and predict the class for the remaining examples by classifier.
B. The framework
Figure 3 highlights the HashTran-DNN framework, which
adds a “hashing layer” to a feed-forward DNN. The training
phase of HashTran-DNN has three steps: (i) extracting features
for representing training samples; (ii) using hash functions to
transform the feature representation of the training samples
to L vector representations (i.e., matrix representations); and
(iii) learning a DNN from the matrix representation. Now we
elaborate these steps and discuss the testing phase.
1) Extracting features: There have been numerous studies
on defining features for malware detections (e.g., [9], [19],
[49]–[53]). These features may be extracted via static anal-
ysis, dynamic analysis, or a hybrid of them. Particularly for
binary feature vectors, “1” means a feature is present in the
sample and “0” means the feature is absent. Many malware
detectors (e.g., [9], [19], [50]) use binary representations while
achieving a satisfying accuracy.
2) Hashing layer: The hashing layer uses some H, such as
HLSH or HLNH, to transform the binary feature representation
to the vector (or more precisely, matrix) representation. (In
our experiments that will be presented in Section VI, each
sample will be transformed to L vectors {Hj(~x)}Lj=1, which
formulates a binary matrix MH(~x) ∈ ZL×T2 for some T .)
Assuming k1 neurons in the first hidden layer handling each
row vector, we have L× k1 neurons in the first hidden layer.
Note that the row order in the matrix representation of samples
does not matter, because each row is treated independently in
the first layer of DNN Z ′ before mixing them at later stages.
3) Learning DNNs: At the training phase, we use the
hashed vector representation to learn a DNN classifier. What
is unique to the HashTran-DNN learning is that the training
phase not only aims to minimize the classification error, but
also leverages the DAE to regularize the DNN. Basically, the
DAE encodes the training samples compactly, and reconstructs
the input from the compact encoding (also known as the latent
space representations). This allows the DAE to retain the
locality information by reconstructing the hash representation
matrix MH, which is related to manifold learning [54] or
representation learning [55].
Specifically, the DAE maps a perturbed matrix MH(~x)⊕∆
for some random noise matrix ∆ to MH(~x). In case of ℓ0-
norm on binary features, a random subset of elements in ∆
have value 1 and the other elements have value 0, where the
number of 1’s is ⌈L× T × p⌉ for some p sampled from the
Gaussian Distribution N(0, (ǫ/n)
2
). The “corrupt” elements of
MH(~x)⊕∆ are meant to simulate adversarial perturbations.
The learned DNN is robust to small perturbations by per-
forming the DAE regularization upon the hash transformation,
which captures the locality preserving property in the data
accurately when the reconstruction error is small.
The weight set of the DAE is θd = {Wh;Wc1;Wd},
and the weight set of the classifier is θc =
{Wh;Wc1;Wc2;Wc3}, where Wh, Wc1, Wc2, and
Wc3 are weight matrices (cf. Figure 3). During the
training phase, we treat DAE as part of the HashTran-DNN
framework and train all the weights jointly. Given a training
7set {(~xi, yi)}Ni=1 and a hashing transformation H, we convert
the scalar label {yi}Ni=1 into the one-hot encoding labels
{~yi}Ni=1 and consider the classification loss function
LC =
1
N
N∑
i=0
L(θc; (Z
′(~xi).~yi)). (11)
The widely-used DAE reconstruction loss function LD is
LD =
1
N
N∑
i=0
‖ DAE(MH(~xi)⊕∆i)−MH(~xi) ‖22, (12)
where DAE(·) is the output of DAE whose activation function
at the last layer is the sigmoid. However, the definition given
by Eq.(12) is not suitable for the setting of the present paper
because the hash representation is binary. As such, we use the
cross-entropy function
LD = − 1
N
N∑
i=0
[MH(~xi) log(DAE(MH(~xi)⊕∆))
+ (1−MH(~xi)) log(1− DAE(MH(~xi)⊕∆))]. (13)
We train HashTran-DNN with the final loss function:
Loss = LC + λDLD, (14)
where λD > 0 is a hyper-parameter that is tuned to strength the
DAE term via an exponential search [56]. This kind of training
process makes the learned DNN classify slightly perturbed
samples correctly and allows us to use the DAE to detect the
out-of-distribution samples in the testing phase.
4) Testing: Since adversarial examples may be far from
the support of the distribution of the training data, HashTran-
DNN aims to reject such out-of-distribution samples (i.e.,
treating them as adversarial samples) before predicting the
class (or a label) for the testing samples. The detection of
out-of-distribution samples is based on the DAE reconstruction
error, an idea inspired by Magnet [35]. Because DAE encoding
and reconstruction are operated on the training set, if a
testing sample is drawn from the same distribution as the
training samples, then a small reconstruction error is expected;
otherwise, we can consider such testing sample as outliers.
Therefore, we need a threshold tr for flagging whether an input
is out-of-distribution or not, which is a hyperparameter of the
DAE. Intuitively, a smaller tr can help detect more adversarial
examples, but runs into the risk of filtering out more normal
samples, leading to a degradation in the classification accuracy.
This suggests us to choose tr via a validation set of non-
adversarial samples such that these samples can pass the filter
at a high rate. HashTran-DNN allows to predict the class of
testing samples if they can pass the DAE-based filter, as shown
in the bottom of Figure 3.
Remark 1. Although HashTran-DNN focuses on enhancing
the robustness of DNNs against adversarial samples, the
framework can be equally applied to enhance the robustness
of other machine learning models. Consider linear SVM under
binary classification as an example. Given {H1,H2, . . . ,HL}
and an instance ~x, the confidence score can be defined as
score = wT · [wTj ·Hj(~x) + bj ] + b; (j = 1, · · · ,L), (15)
where the w’s and b’s are weight vectors and biases of SVMs.
Eq.(15) says that L internal SVMs learn and test over the
corresponding hash transformation Hj(·), and an external
SVM aggregates their outputs to vote the final confidence with
weight w. A majority of the j’s with Hj(~x
′) = Hj(~x) lead
to the robustness against adversarial example ~x′. The (L+1)
SVM models can be trained as usual [57].
C. Analysis
HashTran-DNN can accommodate any H that is locality-
preserving, such as the aforementionedHLSH constructed from
bit sampling and the HLNH obtained from Algorithm 1. In the
subsequent analysis, we make the following restrictions:
• Consider binary feature vectors, namely ~x ∈ {0, 1}n;
• The distance function is the Hamming distance, de-
noted by dH(·, ·), namely dH( ~x1, ~x2) = ‖ ~x1 − ~x2‖0 for
~x1, ~x2 ∈ {0, 1}n. The normalized Hamming distance is
d¯H( ~x1, ~x2) =
1
n
‖ ~x1 − ~x2‖0, namely the fraction of the
coordinates where ~x1 and ~x2 are different. Note that
d¯H( ~x1, ~x2) = 1− Pr(Hi( ~x1) = Hi( ~x2)).
In what follows we prove (i) the existence of a family
of hashing transformations H with the locality-preserving
property that satisfies Ineq. (9) and (ii) an approximation to
distance-preserving property in an effort to approach Eq. (10).
Theorem 1 (HashTran-DNN robustness). There exist hashing
transformations such that Ineq. (9) holds.
Proof. Consider a sample ~x ∈ {0, 1}n and its perturbed
version ~x′ ∈ {0, 1}n with ‖ ~x′ − ~x ‖0 ≤ ǫ. We have 0 ≤
h¯H(~x
′, ~x) ≤ ǫ
n
. When instantiating H as HLSH or HLNH,
H consists of L independent hashing transformations gKi for
1 ≤ i ≤ L, implying
E[#{j ∈ TH : Hj(~x) = Hj(~x′)}]
= L× Pr (gKi (~x) = gKi (~x′)) = L× PK1 ,
where
P1 =
{
1− d¯H(~x′, ~x) if H is instantiated as HLSH
[1− d¯H(~x′, ~x)]m if H is instantiated as HLNH.
By observation, we know that K× ln(P1) ≥ ln(Θ)− ln(L) is
equivalent to L × PK1 ≥ Θ, which is equivalent to Ineq. (9).
That is, there exist H such that Ineq. (9) holds if and only if
K ≤ ln(Θ)−ln(L)ln(P1) .
Theorem 1 says that for a desired threshold value Θ,
there exist hashing transformations with proper choices of
parameters K and L under which Ineq. (9) holds, implying
classification robustness against adversarial samples generated
by small perturbations.
As mentioned above, it is difficult to prove Eq. (10) and
therefore we consider the following weaker result: for any
~x1, ~x2 ∈ {0, 1}n, a hashing transformation Hj does not
change much of the normalized Hamming distance d¯H( ~x1, ~x2)
in the transformed space, namely that there exists some Hj
and κ > 0 such that
E[|d¯H(Hj( ~x1),Hj( ~x2))− d¯H( ~x1, ~x2)|] ≤ κ. (16)
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Theorem 2 (HashTran-DNN classification accuracy). There
exist hashing transformations such that Eq. (16) holds.
Proof. In order to unify the presentation, let us uniformly
denote the functions by hj when using LSH to instantiate
Hj , by DT
m,d
i,j when using LNH to instantiate Hj , by h
m
j
such that h1j = hj indicates LSH, and by h
m
j with m > 1
indicating LNH. The normalized Hamming distance between
gKi ( ~x1) and g
K
i ( ~x2) is
1
mK
K∑
j=1
dH(h
m
j ( ~x1), h
m
j ( ~x2)).
Let d¯H =
1
n
dH( ~x1, ~x2) and d¯H,j =
1
m
dH(h
m
j ( ~x1), h
m
j ( ~x2)).
By doubling the value of parameter K in the case of LSH hj
or the case of LNH DT
m,d
i,j , we have
E


∣∣∣∣∣∣d¯H −
1
2K
2K∑
j=1
d¯H,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣


= E


∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
2
(d¯H − 1
K
K∑
j=1
d¯H,j) +
1
2
(d¯H − 1
K
2K∑
j=K+1
d¯H,j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣


≤ 1
2
E


∣∣∣∣∣∣d¯H −
1
K
K∑
j=1
d¯H,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣

+ 1
2
E


∣∣∣∣∣∣d¯H −
1
K
2K∑
j=K+1
d¯H,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣


= E


∣∣∣∣∣∣d¯H −
1
K
K∑
j=1
d¯H,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣

 .
This leads to Eq. (16) and the theorem follows.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section we report our implementation of HashTran-
DNN and evaluate its effectiveness via standard metrics (see,
e.g., [58]) that include the classification accuracy (Acc), the
False-Positive Rate (FPR), and the False-Negative Rate (FNR).
A. Dataset and feature extraction
We use an Android malware dataset that was collected from
the Koodous Android malware analysis platform [59]. This
dataset contains 49,829 Android malware samples and 48,406
benign Android samples. We treat the malware samples as
non-adversarial samples. We split the dataset into three disjoint
sets: a training set of 78,588 samples (including 39,914
malware samples and 38,674 benign samples), a validation
set of 4,912 samples (including 2,475 malware samples and
2,437 benign samples), and a testing set of 14,735 samples
(including 7,487 malware samples and 7,248 benign samples).
In order to extract features of the samples, we use
the Androguard [60] to unpack Android Packages (APKs).
We use the following kinds of static Android features:
(i) Permissions requested by an application (e.g., an-
droid.permission.SEND SMS). (ii) Features indicating the ap-
plication of hardware (e.g., android.hardware.wifi). (iii) Names
of application components including activity, service, broad-
cast receiver and provider. (iv) Intents intent-filter used to
communicate with each other. (v) Permissions actually used
for calling Application Programming Interface (API) [61].
These features are also considered by previous studies for
Android malware detection [9], [53], [61]. The first four kinds
of features can be extracted from the AndroidManifest.XML
file, and the last kind of features can be extracted by analyz-
ing the disassembled code. The feature space is very large,
containing 519,550 features in total. We propose reducing the
feature space by removing the low-frequency features, which
are the features that only occasionally appear in the samples.
After removing the features with low-frequency (< 15), we
obtain 13,596 features in total.
B. Waging the four attacks
Recall that we use the ℓ0-norm to bound the degree of
perturbation, namely
dH(~x, ~x
′) = ‖~x′ − ~x‖0 ≤ ǫ,
where ǫ bounds the number of features that are perturbed. The
objective of the attacker is to manipulate a malware sample ~x
with C(~x) = 1 to an adversarial sample ~x′ such that C(~x′) =
0. In order to wage the four attacks (reviewed in Section
III-B), the attacker needs a surrogate DNN classifier helping
generate adversarial examples. Since the attacker knows the
training dataset and the feature set, the attacker can train its
own surrogate model [27], [35]. In our experiments, we train
(on behalf of the attacker) a surrogate DNN classifier with
three hidden layers, where the first layer has 4,096 neurons,
the second layer has 512 neurons, and the third layer has
32 neurons. In each of the four attack experiments, there
are two steps: selecting features to perturb, perturbing the
selected features, and validating the perturbations, which are
elaborated below.
1) Selecting features to perturb: In order to perturb mal-
ware samples while preserving malicious functionalities, we
make the following observations.
• We cannot delete or replace objects in the AndroidMan-
ifest.xml file because of the following two reasons. (i)
This file declares the objects (e.g., requested permission,
application components and hardware) that must be de-
clared to the Android operation system; otherwise, these
objects and their associated functions will be ignored.
(ii) The declared application components are the public
API that may be used by the other Android apps or the
Android system, meaning that deleting or replacing them
may crash the other apps or the Android system.
• Malware may require extra permissions, hardware re-
sources, and unnecessary components from the Android
system, suggesting us to insert permission requirement,
hardware requirement, activity, service and broadcast
receiver into AndroidManifest.xml.
The preceding observations suggest us to insert some features
into malware samples to generate adversarial samples. Perti-
nent to the dataset, 11,863 (among the 13,596) features can be
perturbed. In other words, any of these 11,863 features that is
absent in a malware sample may be inserted by the four attack
9methods reviewed in Section III-B. Additional care needs to
be taken for waging the CW and Mimicry attacks.
For waging the CW attack, which cannot be directly applied
to the binary feature space—the context of the present paper.
Therefore, we propose using the following variant of the CW
attack. We use
~x′ = max(clip(~x′), ~x) ◦ ~v + ~x ◦ (1− ~v)
= max(min(max(~x′, 0), 1), ~x) ◦ ~v + ~x ◦ (1 − ~v)
to guide the perturbation when minimizing the loss function
given by Eq. (8), wheremax(·, ·) andmin(·, ·) are respectively
the element-wise maximum and minimum operation, and ~v
ensures that the perturbation do not disrupt the malicious func-
tionality (i.e., only the 11,863 features can be inserted). Once
we obtain the optimization result, we use the nearest neighbor
in the discrete space as ~x′, while obeying the constraint that
only the 11,863 features can be inserted.
For waging the Mimicry attack, we propose using the
following heuristic to increase the effectiveness of the Mimicry
attack. Specifically, we use 60 benign samples to guide the per-
turbation of a single malware sample, leading to 60 adversarial
samples; then, we select the adversarial sample (among the 60)
that causes the lowest classification accuracy to the attacker’s
surrogate model (i.e., accommodating the worst-case scenario).
Each of the four attack methods selects its own set of
features to perturb or insert. The number of perturbed features
in the JSMA attack, the GD-KDE attack, and the CW attack
is bounded from above by the perturbation parameter ǫ, which
is the number of features that can be perturbed (pertinent to
the context of binary feature representation). Nevertheless, the
Mimicry attack implies that the number of perturbed features
is not bounded because it mimics a benign sample as much
as possible and parameter ǫ is not applicable in this case.
2) Perturbing the selected features: In the four attack
experiments, we use the same set of 500 malware samples
that are randomly select from the malware samples in the
dataset; these 500 malware samples are all classified by the
attacker’s surrogate DNN model as malicious. In each attack
experiment, we insert into the malware samples the features
that are respectively selected by the attack in question (as
described in the previous step), and then we re-package the
modified APK into adversarial samples. In our experiment,
we use the disassembly and repackage tool known as Apktool
[62] and use the ElementTree API [63] to modify the Android-
Manifest.xml file for inserting those selected features. In each
attack experiment, we successfully perturb 496 (among the
500) malware samples, while noting that the Apktool fails to
disassemble the other 4 malware samples. This means that we
generate 496 adversarial samples in each of the four attacks.
3) Validating the perturbations: In order to validate that the
496 adversarial samples are still malware, we use the dynami-
cal malware analysis tool known as CuckooDroid sandbox [64]
to execute them. For the sake of efficiency, we randomly select
23 adversarial examples from the 496 adversarial samples and
confirm their maliciousness as follows. We use a sandbox
to install the adversarial samples in an android emulator,
monitor the adversarial sample’s execution [65], and submit
the adversarial sample to Virustotal [66]. These 23 adversarial
samples are all deemed as malicious because each sample is
detected by at least 10 detectors as malicious, which is perhaps
acceptable according to a recent study on the trustworthiness
of VirusTotal [67].
C. Evaluating the effectiveness of the HashTran-DNN defense
The evaluation is centered at answering the following three
Research Questions (RQ):
• RQ1: How effective is HashTran-DNN?
• RQ2: How robust is HashTran-DNN when compared with
other deep learning-based defense methods?
• RQ3: What contributes to the effectiveness of HashTran-
DNN? The answer to this question may be seen as a
first step towards answering the much more difficult open
problem: Why deep learning is effective?
1) RQ1: How effective is HashTran-DNN?: For answering
RQ1, we set ǫ = 10 for the JSMA, GD-KDE, and CW
attacks, meaning that at most 10 features are perturbed. Since
HashTran-DNN uses hashing transformations and possibly
a DAE, we consider four combinations in terms of the H
instantiation (as LSH or LNH) and whether or not to use DAE,
namely: (i) HashTran-DNN with LSH, where LSH is derived
from the bit sampling method; (ii) HashTran-DNN with LNH,
where LNH is derived from Algorithm 1; (iii) HashTran-DNN
with LSH-DAE; (iv) HashTran-DNN with LNH-DAE.
For hyper-parameters, we focus on tuning the following:
• K: the number of hash function hj or DT
m,d
i,j respectively
in gKLSH or g
K
LNH, where 1 ≤ j ≤ K .
• L: the number of gKLSH or g
K
LNH respectively in HLSH or
HLNH.
For training the four kinds of HashTran-DNN models, we use
the Adam optimization method with batch size 128, epochs
30, dropout rate 0.4, and learning rate 0.001. We select the
model that achieves the highest classification accuracy on the
afore-mentioned validation set of 4,912 samples. The other
hyper-parameters are selected as follows.
TABLE II: Acc (accuracy) of HashTran-DNN with LSH when
applied to the testing set of 14,735 samples (containing no
adversarial samples, the 2nd column) and when applied to
the 496 adversarial samples respectively generated by the four
attacks (the 3rd to 6th columns), under different choices of m.
m Acc (%)
Acc (%) under attack
JSMA GD-KDE CW Mimicry
15 91.30 68.64 81.72 84.17 68.05
30 91.40 71.79 92.52 91.32 65.35
60 91.54 90.43 92.89 91.88 69.56
100 91.75 93.97 93.50 93.92 74.41
116 91.71 93.55 93.72 95.14 74.05
For training a model of HashTran-DNN with LNH, we set
the height of the Decision Trees as d = 4. For selecting m, we
set (K,L) = (32, 64) and vary m from 2d − 1 to √n, where
n is the dimension of the feature space. Table II summaries
the results, and shows that m = 15 leads to the lowest
classification accuracy of the HashTran-DNN model against
the JSMA, GD-KDE, and CW attacks. As m increases, the
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classification accuracy with respect to the original testing set
(containing no adversarial samples) steadily increases, albeit
slightly (the 2nd column). However, the classification accuracy
against the 496 adversarial samples, which are respectively
generated by the four attacks (the 3rd to 6th columns), varies
substantially. These observations suggest us to set m ≈ √n.
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Fig. 4: Accuracies of HashTran-DNN with LSH-DAE and
HashTran-DNN with LNH-DAE when applied to the testing
set of 14,735 samples (containing no adversarial samples)
and when applied to the 496 adversarial samples that are
respectively generated by the four attacks, under different
choice of λD .
For training HashTran-DNN with LSH-DAE and HashTran-
DNN with LNH-DAE, we sample the probability for noise
injection from max(0,N(0, (10/n)2)), where N(·, ·) is the
Gaussian Distribution. We set the threshold tr to make 99.9%
of the validation set of 4,912 samples pass the DAE-based
detector. We select λD as follows.
• In the case of HashTran-DNN with LSH-DAE, we set
(K,L) = (128, 128) and vary λD from 1 to 1024 expo-
nentially. From Figure 4a, we observe that the accuracy
against the JSMA, GD-KDE and CW attacks increases
with λD, while noting that the accuracy on the testing
set of 14,735 samples (containing no adversarial samples)
drops slightly. This suggests us to select λD = 256 for
HashTran-DNN with LSH-DAE.
• In the case of HashTran-DNN with LSH-DAE, we set
(K,L) = (32, 32) and vary λD from 1 to 1024 exponen-
tially. Figure 4b shows that the accuracy under each attack
varies slightly with λD . Therefore, we select λD = 1.
Table III summarizes the evaluation result. We make the
following observations. First, for HashTran-DNN with LSH,
the classification accuracy increases with K (the number of
hash function in gK), which confirms Theorem 2 in Section
V-C, namely that increasing K can improve the classification
accuracy against non-adversarial malware samples. When a
higher accuracy (≥ 91.79%) is achieved against the testing
set containing no adversarial samples, the accuracy drops
substantially against any of the JSMA, GD-KDE, and CW
attacks. Second, HashTran-DNN with LNH, although achiev-
ing a slightly lower classification accuracy in some cases than
HashTran-DNN with LSH against the testing set that contains
no adversarial examples, the former achieves a much higher
classification accuracy (≥ 90.76%) than the latter against the
JSMA, GD-KDE, and CW attacks as well as a 20% increase
in the classification accuracy against the Mimicry attack. This
can be attributed to the fact that the former treats features more
equally than the latter. Third, using DAE can further improve
the classification accuracy against the four attacks. This is
especially true for HashTran-DNN with LNH-DAE, which
increases, for example, the classification accuracy against the
CW attack from 68.83% to 93.55%.
Insight 1. HashTran-DNN with LNH can effectively defend
against the JSMA, GD-KDE, and CW attacks. Moreover,
HashTran-DNN with LNH-DAE can effectively defend against
all of the four attacks.
2) RQ2: How robust is HashTran-DNN when compared
with other defense methods?: We compare HashTran-DNN
with the RFN [19] and iterative Adversarial Training defense
methods [21] reviewed in Section III-C. We conduct five
experiments: (i) Standard DNN; (ii) the RFN defense; (iii) the
Adversarial Training defense; (iv) HashTran-DNN with LSH-
DAE; and (v) HashTran-DNN with LNH-DAE (noting that
the last two are chosen because they are respectively more
effective than HashTran-DNN with LSH and HashTran-DNN
with LNH). In each experiment, we consider five scenarios:
the testing set of 14,735 samples (containing no adversarial
samples) as well as the 496 adversarial samples that are
respectively generated by the JSMA, GD-KDE, CW, and
Mimicry attacks. In order to see the impact of the degree ǫ of
perturbation, we consider ǫ = 10, 20, 30 for the JSMA, GD-
KDE, and CW attacks (while recalling that ǫ is not applicable
to the mimicry attack).
Table IV summarizes the resulting neural network struc-
tures and hyper-parameters, while the other parameters are
described as follows. We select the nullification rate in the
RFN defense by sampling from the Gaussian Distribution
N(0.3, 0.052), while making the adversarial training penalize
the adversarial spaces searched by the JSMA attack method
(ǫ =10) iteratively. According to Table III, we set (K,L) =
(128, 256) and (K,L) = (32, 64) for HashTran-DNN with
LSH-DAE and HashTran-DNN with LNH-DAE, respectively.
We select the model that achieves the highest classification ac-
curacy against the validation set of 4,912 samples (containing
no adversarial samples).
Table V summarizes the experimental result. We make the
following observations. First, the standard DNN is vulnerable
to the four attacks, and the higher the perturbation (when
applicable), the lower the classification accuracy. Second, the
four defense methods incur no significant side-effects in the
absence of adversarial examples, meaning that they can be
used even if the attacker does not launch adversarial samples.
This matter is important in dealing with the uncertainty that
in the real world, the defender does not know for certain
when the attacker will launch adversarial samples. Third, the
RFN defense cannot effectively defend against any of the four
attacks. The adversarial training defense is highly effective
against the JSMA, GD-KDE, and CW attacks, but not very
effective against the Mimicry attack. In contrast, HashTran-
DNN with LSH-DAE and HashTran-DNN with LNH-DAE
achieve a classification accuracy that is comparable to what
is achieved by the adversarial training defense against the
JSMA, GD-KDE, and CW attacks (above 92.14%, except
for the GD-KDE attack with ǫ = 10, which leads to a
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TABLE III: HashTran-DNN Acc (accuracy) without using adversarial samples (testing set of 14,735 samples, the 3rd column)
vs. using 496 adversarial malware samples respectively (the 6th to 9th columns) under different hyper-parameters (K,L).
Classifiers (K,L)
Acc (%) FNR (%) FPR (%) Acc (%) with ǫ=10 Acc (%)
absence of adversarial samples JSMA attack GD-KDE attack CW attack Mimicry attack
HashTran DNN w/ LSH
(32,64) 88.25 18.82 4.42 75.87 70.26 67.16 50.47
(64,64) 91.15 13.87 3.67 81.56 76.62 70.09 49.89
(32,128) 91.13 14.24 3.35 86.00 81.11 70.56 52.26
(64,128) 91.79 13.89 2.35 71.93 82.17 77.48 51.48
(128,128) 92.19 12.46 2.83 64.51 73.02 68.83 52.85
(128,256) 92.11 13.22 2.31 64.12 60.69 71.23 52.93
(256,256) 92.61 12.87 1.74 65.99 59.35 65.52 47.71
HashTran DNN w/ LNH
(32,32) 91.69 14.01 2.46 90.76 94.31 93.16 73.74
(32,64) 91.71 14.07 2.35 93.55 93.72 95.15 74.05
(64,64) 91.54 14.24 2.45 95.93 93.92 95.76 79.66
HashTran DNN w/ LSH-DAE
(128,128) 91.92 13.41 2.57 92.34 90.93 93.55 86.49
(128,256) 92.28 12.54 2.75 94.35 89.92 92.14 88.31
(256,256) 92.50 12.46 2.37 91.73 89.52 87.50 87.10
HashTran DNN w/ LNH-DAE
(32,32) 91.56 13.73 2.98 96.37 94.56 97.58 91.13
(32,64) 91.73 13.62 2.73 96.98 95.16 97.18 92.94
(64,64) 91.65 15.12 1.37 96.17 94.15 96.57 87.70
TABLE IV: Hyper-parameters used in the experiments for answering RQ2.
Defense
Hyper-parameters
DNN architecture Activation Optimizer Learning rate Dropout rate Batch size Epoch
No defense (standard DNN) 4096-512-32-2 Relu Adam 0.001 0.4 128 30
RFN 4096-512-32-2 Relu Adam 0.001 0.4 128 30
Adversarial Training 4096-512-32-2 Relu Adam 0.001 0.4 128 30
HashTran-DNN w/ LSH-DAE 256,128-512-32-2 Relu Adam 0.001 0.4 128 30
HashTran-DNN w/ LNH-DAE 64,128-512-32-2 Relu Adam 0.001 0.4 128 30
TABLE V: Classification accuracy against the testing set of 14,735 samples containing no adversarial samples (No attack) and
the 496 adversarial samples respectively generated by the JSMA, GD-KDE, CW, and Mimicry attacks.
Defense No attack
JSMA attack GD-KDE attack CW attack
Mimicry
ǫ = 10 ǫ = 20 ǫ = 30 ǫ = 10 ǫ = 20 ǫ = 30 ǫ = 10 ǫ = 20 ǫ = 30
No defense (standard DNN) 92.50 58.40 41.71 35.13 51.11 10.88 0.614 57.34 38.70 5.552 13.00
RFN 91.93 68.72 45.81 40.07 68.42 37.67 12.17 70.87 53.63 35.71 26.14
Adversarial Training 92.18 98.94 99.78 100.0 98.94 99.58 100.0 98.74 99.78 100.0 85.41
HashTran-DNN w/ LSH-DAE 92.28 94.35 100.0 100.0 89.92 94.56 96.17 92.14 98.59 99.80 88.31
HashTran-DNN w/ LNH-DAE 91.73 96.98 96.77 96.77 95.16 94.56 93.55 97.18 95.56 93.35 92.94
89.92% classification accuracy). Moreover, both HashTran-
DNN defense methods can more effectively defend against
the Mimicry attack than the adversarial training defense, with
a 7.53% increase in the case of HashTran-DNN with LNH-
DAE. We reiterate that this effectiveness is achieved without
using adversarial samples to train the HashTran-DNN models.
Insight 2. Standard DNNs can be ruined by adversarial
malware samples. RFN is not effective against any of the
four attacks. Adversarial Training is effective against the
JSMA, GD-KDE, and CW attacks, but not effective against the
Mimicry attack. HashTran-DNN, while not using adversarial
samples in training, is effective against the four attacks.
3) RQ3: What contributes to the effectiveness of HashTran-
DNN?: It is an open problem to explain the effectiveness
of deep learning models. Nevertheless, we can at least get
some insights into the effectiveness of HashTran-DNN. For
this purpose, we conduct four experiments corresponding to
the four attacks. In each experiment, we consider five DNN
models: (i) Standard DNN with DAE, denoted by DNN-
DAE; (ii) HashTran-DNNwith LSH; (iii) HashTran-DNN with
LNH; (iv) HashTran-DNN with LSH-DAE; and (v) HashTran-
DNN with LNH-DAE. The idea is that by comparing the
classification accuracy of (i), which does not using the hash
representation, and that of (ii)-(iii), which does use the hash
representation, we can observe the contribution of the hash
representations to the classification accuracy.
In the DNN-DAE experiment, the hyper-parameters are
the same as the HashTran-DNN with LSH-DAE experiment.
For fair comparison, we train a DNN-DAE model, which
achieves a 92.09% accuracy on the testing set of 14,735
samples (contains no adversarial samples), while noting that
this accuracy is comparable to that of the standard DNN model
(92.50%). In the experiments of HashTran-DNN with LSH and
HashTran-DNN with LSH-DAE, we set (K,L) = (128, 256)
because as shown in Table III, this combination leads to a good
classification accuracy on the original testing set (containing
no adversarial samples). In the experiments of HashTran-
DNN with LNH and HashTran-DNN with LNH-DAE, we
set (K,L) = (32, 64) because as shown in Table III, this
combination leads to the highest classification accuracy on the
original testing set (containing no adversarial samples).
Figure 5 plots the classification accuracy of the five experi-
ments mentioned above. We make the following observations.
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Fig. 5: Classification accuracy against the 496 adversarial samples that are respectively generated by the JSMA, GD-KDE,
CW, and Mimicry attacks with different degrees of perturbations, while noting that for the Mimicry attack, the degree of
perturbation is not an input parameter but averaged over the actual perturbations (because ǫ is not applicable).
First, the contribution of LSH and LNH hashing to the
classification accuracy decreases as the degree of perturbation
increases in the JSMA, GD-KDE, and CW attacks. Second,
the use of DAE can offset the incapability of hashing in coping
with a high degree of perturbation. This can be attributed
to the fact that the DAE can filter testing samples that are
far away from the distribution of the training samples. Third,
there is a substantial drop in the classification accuracy of
the DNN-DAE model against the 496 adversarial samples
that are respectively generated by the JSMA, GD-KDE, and
CW attacks with perturbation bound at ǫ = 30. However,
the classification accuracy increase when ǫ increases above
ǫ = 30. This phenomenon is not exhibited by the HashTran-
DNN with LSH-DAE and HashTran-DNN with LNH-DAE.
We attribute this discrepancy to the following: On one hand,
the effectiveness of DAE against small, but not large, perturba-
tions (i.e., the adversarial samples are close to the distribution
of the training set) is known for its instability [32], ex-
plaining the phenomenon exhibited by the DNN-DAE model.
On the other hand, the instability of DAE is eliminated by
the HashTran-DNN with LSH-DAE and HashTran-DNN with
LNH-DAE because the hashing transformation (or the hash
representation) regularizes the corresponding HashTran-DNN
to capture the locality information in the latent space.
Insight 3. The effectiveness of HashTran-DNN in detecting
adversarial malware examples comes from two aspects: the
hashing transformation, which helps DNNs cope with small
perturbations, and the DAE, which regularizes DNN and filters
large perturbations.
VII. LIMITATIONS
The present study has several limitations. (i) The framework
considers DNN only, meaning that it needs to be extended
to accommodate other kinds of deep learning models. This
is by no means straightforward. (ii) Our instantiations of
HashTran-DNN consider two hashing transformations, namely
LSH and LNH, while recalling that the specification of LNH is
constructive rather than an explicit expression. Future research
needs to define LNH explicitly and consider possibly other
hash functions that can lead to better results. (iii) The present
study focuses on gray-box attacks. Future research needs
to investigate more rigorous white-box attacks, in which all
parameters are exposed to the attacker. (iv) The present study
focuses on malware classification, which is our interest and
original motivation. It is interesting to investigate how the
HashTran-DNN framework may be applied to image process-
ing and other application domains.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented the HashTran-DNN framework for mak-
ing DNN-based malware classifiers robust against adversarial
malware samples. The framework is centered at using locality-
preserving hash transformations and DAE to reduce, if not
eliminate, the effect of adversarial perturbations. Experimental
results show that the framework can effectively defend against
the four attacks.
Future research problems are abundant. In addition to the
limitations mentioned in Section VII, it is an outstanding open
problem to fully characterize the implications of the locality-
preserving property in defending against adversarial samples.
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